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Abstract
In a continuous time life cycle model of consumption with uncer-
tain lifetime and no “pure time preference”, we use a non-parametric
specification of rank dependent utility theory to characterize the pref-
erences of the agents. From a normative point of view, the paper
discusses the implication of adding an axiom of time consistency to
the former model. We prove that time consistency holds for a much
wider class of probability weighting functions than the identity one
characterizing the expected utility model. This special class of proba-
bility weighting functions provides foundations for a constant subjec-
tive rate of discount which interact multiplicatively with the instan-
taneous conditional probability of dying. We show that even if agent
are time consistent, life annuities no more provide perfect insurance
against the risk to live.
Code JEL: D81 D91
Key words : intertemporal choice; life cycle theory of consump-
tion and saving; uncertain lifetime; life insurance; time consistency;
rank dependent utility.
Thanks:
As part of the behavioral revolution, the traditional exponential discount-
ing model has been at stack in the last thirty years. Following the pioneering
work of Ainslie (1975) and Thaler (1981), many “anomalies in intertemporal
choice” (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) have been documented (see Frederick
et al., 2002, for a survey).
∗Ecole normale supe´rieure de Cachan and Centre d’e´conomie de la Sorbonne (UMR
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There is a long tradition in economics to distinguish two kinds of primi-
tive for explaining discounting. First, discounting can be explained by purely
psychological factors, such as impatience, captured by the discount function.
If the discount function is exponential as in the seminal model proposed by
Samuelson (1937), then time preference is characterized by a “pure rate of
time preference” (i.e. the log derivative of the discount function) that is
invariant with time and the level of consumption. Even if some authors have
considered early the possibility for the discount factor to be “non-exponetial”
(for example Yaari, 1964; Harvey, 1986), it is only with the behavioral revo-
lution that alternative ad hoc parametrical discount functions have been pro-
posed and used systematically in the applied economics literature. Among
them the “quasi hyperbolic” discount function (Phelps and Pollak, 1968;
Laibson, 1997) is probably the most popular.
The second explanation for discounting is just to consider that future
prospect are uncertain. In this case, it is reasonable to consider that the
utility of future prospects will be weighted according to their probability to
be effectively consumed at the given date (see Sozou, 1998; Dasgupta and
Maskin, 2005, for a general discussion of that topic). Among this literature,
models of intertemporal choice with uncertain lifetime, pioneered by Yaari
(1965), are good tools to investigate the theory of discounting. Yaari (1965)’s
seminal paper was considering expected utility maximizers with known prob-
ability distributions of the “age of death”, and standard exponetial discount-
ing life cycle-utility. More recent models have considered various kind of
more sophisticated utility framework to deal with lifetime uncertainty. For
example, Moresi (1999) is considering an application of Selden (1978)’s “or-
dinal certainty equivalent hypothesis”. Bommier (2006) considers a concave
transformation of the lifecycle utility to explain “risk aversion with respect
to length of live”. Halevy (2008) uses Yaari (1987)’s “Dual theory of choice”.
Ludwig and Zimper (2012) and Groneck et al. (2012) consider a non-bayesian
treatments of ambiguous survival probability.
The imbrication of risk and time preference is also of first importance
for analyzing life insurance, which was Yaari (1965)’s initial purpose. In
this paper, we build a model of intertemporal choice of consumption and
saving with uncertain lifetime in which the agent psychologically transforms
her survival probability distribution, like in Quiggin (1982)’s rank-dependent
utility model, or in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), cumulative prospect the-
ory. The idea of introducing rank dependent utility in this setting has been
already explored by Drouhin (2001) and Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006).
The originality of this paper is that we use continuous time modeling1 and
1Like in Yaari (1965).
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optimal control to solve the model. With that methodology, we are able to
discuss the important topic of time consistency, the main criteria of rational-
ity over time. Following Strotz (1956), there exists a conventional wisdom
in considering that any departure from exponentially discounted expected
utility will imply time inconsistency. This paper will give a counterexample.
In particular, it shows that any agent who transforms the probability distri-
butions of the age of death with a power function are time consistent. That
provides foundations for a coefficient of time preference that interact mul-
tiplicatively with the probability of dying, instead of additively in Yaari’s
approach. However, it also demonstrates that life annuities do not neces-
sarily provide perfect insurance, even in the case in which agents are time
consistent2.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the utility func-
tional used. Section 2 solves the model in absence of life annuities. Section 3
discusses time consistency. Section 4 solves the model when agent has access
to life annuities. Finally section 5 concludes.
1 A rank dependent utility model of consump-
tion and savings with uncertain lifetime
We consider an agent’s choice of her consumption profile. A consumption
profile is a function of time defined on the interval [0, T ], with 0 the age of
birth and T an arbitrary constant, interpreted as the maximum possible life
duration for the agent. Because we are interested in understanding the way
the timing of decision influences the choice of the consumption profile, we
will denote by t ∈ [0, T ), the date of the decision.
Let us consider, in a first step, the case in which the agent, alive at date t,
knows for sure her age of death s.
H1 If an agent knows with certainty her date of death s, her intertemporal
preferences can be represented by an intertemporal utility functional assumed
to be additive, and stationary, with no “pure time preference”:
Vt (c, s) =
∫
s
t
u (c (τ)) dτ (1)
with u′ (c (τ)) > 0 and u′′ (c (τ)) < 0.
H2 (monotonicity according to lifespan). ∀c : s′ > s⇒ Vt (c, s
′) > Vt (c, s)
H1 and H2 implies that u is positive. H2 means that for a given consump-
tion profile, outcomes will be always ranked according to lifespan. When
2The only exception being the case of expected utility.
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introducing uncertainty our model will be a natural candidate for using rank
dependent utility. The fact that we do not postulate any kind of “pure”
time preference implies that, in our model, lifetime uncertainty is the only
primitive of time preference.
The agent actually does not know with certainty her age of death. We
assume that for a living agent, at each age t, the age of death s > t is
an absolutely continuous random variable defined on the interval [t, T ]. We
denote by pit (s) > 0 the probability density function of the random vari-
able, assumed to be differentiable at least once and Πt (s) the cumulative
distribution function. We thus have:
Πt (s) =
∫
s
t
pit (τ) dτ
with Πt (T ) = 1.
Πt (s) can be interpreted as “the probability of being dead at age s, knowing
you are alive at date t”, and, (1− Πt (s)) “the probability of being alive at
date s, knowing you are alive at date t”. We can derive from Bayes formula
that for s > t′ > t:
(1− Πt′ (s)) (1− Πt (t
′)) = (1− Πt (s)) (2)
and
pit′ (s) =
pit (s)
1− Πt (t′)
(3)
In the special case where s = t′, we get the hazard rate at date s:
pis (s) =
pit (s)
1− Πt (s)
(4)
We are thus facing a special problem of choice in uncertainty. If we assume
that the agent is an expected utility maximizer as in Yaari (1965), we have:
EVt (c) =
∫
T
t
∫
s
t
u(c(τ)dτdΠt(s) (5)
If we now retain a more general model of choice under uncertainty, in which
agents transform outcomes and probability distributions as in Quiggin (1982,
1993) or Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we have :
RDUt (c) =
∫
T
t
∫
s
t
u(c(τ)dτdh(Πt(s)) (6)
with (h) a probability weighting function assumed to be continuous an twice
differentiable, and such that: h (0) = 0, h (1) = 1 and h′ (Πt (s)) > 0.
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Let us notice that (5) is a special case of (6) when h (Πt (s)) = Πt (s). Inte-
grating (6) by parts, we obtain:
RDUt (c) =
∫
T
t
(1− h (Πt (s))) u (c (s)) ds (7)
For the agent, the expected present value at date t of the utility stream
between t and T is the integral over this interval of the product of the utility of
consumption at each date s of the interval with the subjective weight given by
the agent to the event ”being alive at date this date s”. Equation (11) makes
explicit our initial intuition within the continuous time framework. The
factor ft (s) = (1− h (Πt (s))) is the discount factor applied to utility of the
consumption at date s viewed from date t. It depends only on the probability
distribution of the ages of death and the subjective transformation of this
probability distribution. It is continuous, derivable and strictly decreasing
from one to zero on the interval [t, T ].
Taking the log-derivative of this discount factor, we can also define the rate
of discount of utility at date s viewed from date t:
θt(s)
def
=
h′ (Πt(s))) pit (s)
1− h (Πt (s))
(8)
Thus we can rewrite the intertemporal rank-dependent utility functional (7):
RDUt (c) =
∫
T
t
exp
(∫
t
s
θt (τ) dτ
)
u (c (s)) ds (9)
At this stage, we just want to notice that the mathematical structures
of those discount factor and rate provides a very interesting case. On the
one hand, this mathematical structure is much more general than the one
that prevails in traditional exponential or hyperbolic model of intertemporal
choice. On the other hand, the mathematical structure is also much more
precise than the most general form studied by Yaari (1964) where the discount
factor is only assumed to be positive and differentiable.
As in Drouhin (2001), the rate of discount can be decomposed in two
factors. The first one, pit (s), the probability density associated with the event
“dying at date s, knowing that your alive at date t”, can be interpreted as the
objective part of time preference. The second one, h′ (Πt (s))/(1− h (Πt (s))),
depends on the way the agent transforms probability distributions. It can
be interpreted as the subjective part of time preference. The objective part is
exactly the same as in Yaari (1965). The subjective part stems from the rank-
dependent formulation. It will be of first importance when we will discuss
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the consequences of this formulation for standard results on time consistency
and life insurance.
We are now going to investigate the properties of the choice of the optimal
consumption path made by an agent at date t.
2 The optimal consumption path with no life
annuities
To express the optimal consumption path, we have first to define the feasible
set of consumption profiles. We assume that at each date s the living agent
receives a flow of non-financial income w(s) assumed to be continuous and
differentiable and a flow of financial income proportional to her asset (a (s)).
Those incomes are either used for current consumption or saved for future
consumption. In this part we assume that there are no life annuities. The
only asset available for savings is standard bond earning a constant rate
of interest r. Thus, at each time s, the standard intertemporal budgetary
constraint holds:
∀s ∈ [0, T ] , a˙(s) = w(s) + ra(s)− c(s) (10)
We also assume that there is no “bequest motive” implying that an agent
living its maximum possible life-duration will choose to leave no bequest
a(T ) = 0. Thus, if between t and T , we sum the differential constraints (10)
at each date weighted by the economical discount factor exp (−r s), we ob-
tain after some simple manipulations that, for an agent living the maximum
possible life-duration :
a(t) +
∫
T
t
w(s)e−r(s−t)ds =
∫
T
t
c(s)e−r(s−t)ds (11)
This is the very standard life cycle budgetary constraints, the present value of
all incomes over the life cycle is equal to the present value of the consumption
stream.
Thus we can express the total stock of assets a date t:
a(t) =
∫
s
0
(w(s)− c(s))e−r(s−t)ds (12)
We now consider an agent at date t who has to decide her optimal consump-
tion path between t and T. We denote ct(s) the optimal consumption path
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decided at date t for the time interval [t, T ]. Thus ct (s) is the solution of the
following program:
Pt


max
c
RDU(c) =
∫
T
t
(1− h (Πt(s))) u (c(s)) ds
u.c. a˙(s) = w(s) + r a(s)− c(s))
a(t) = cst
a(T ) = 0
Because of the continuity of (w) (h) and (Πt) and the continuity and strict
concavity of (u) this program can be shown to admit a unique solution that
will be continuous and derivable3. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum princi-
ple, the resolution of such problem implies to solve a system of differential
equations. If, for not losing generality of the results, we refuse to specify
special “easy to use” functional form for utility, earnings and probability dis-
tribution of the age of death, the only thing we can do is to derive the rate
of growth of the optimal consumption path planned at date t.
Proposition 1. Without life annuities, at each date s, the rate of growth of
the optimal consumption path planned at date t is:
c˙t(s)
ct(s)
=
r − θt(s)
γt(s)
(13)
with γt(s)
def
= −
u′′ (ct(s))
u′ (ct(s))
ct(s) (14)
the coefficient of relative resistance toward intertemporal substitution
Proof: The Hamiltonian of agent’s program is:
H = (1− h (Πt (s))) u (c (s)) + λ (s) (w (s) + r a (s)− ct (s))
First order conditions gives:
∂H
∂c
= 0⇒ λ (s) = (1− h (Πt (s))) u
′ (ct (s)) (15)
∂H
∂a
= −
dλ
ds
(s) = −λ˙s ⇒
λ˙s
λs
= −r (16)
3For a purpose of simplicity, we have not taken into account the borrowing constraints
that is usually associated with the model with no life annuities/insurance. See Leung
(1994) for an extensive discussion of this topic.
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Taking the logarithm of (15) and differentiating according to s e we get:
λ˙s
λs
= −
h′ (Πt (s)) pit (s)
1− h (Πt (s))
+
u′′ (ct (s))
u′ (ct (s))
dc
ds
(s) (17)
Comparing (16) and (17), and using definition (8), we deduce proposition
1.
Proposition 1 is the most general prediction one can make within the life
cycle theory of consumption and saving. The rate of growth of the consump-
tion path is the difference between the rate of interest (economic discount
rate) and the rate of time preference, both divided by an index of the cur-
vature of the utility function usually referred as the coefficient of relative
risk aversion or more properly in this context, according to Gollier (2001),
as the resistance to intertemporal substitution. The important point is that,
as in Yaari (1965) the rate of time discounting is no more constant and can
give a wide variety of possible dynamic for consumption. But contrarily to
Yaari (1965) it is not only the properties of the probability distribution of
the ages of death that matters. The way agents transform subjectively this
probability distribution will also matter. If we want to go further, we have
to specify some more restrictions to the model.
3 Time consistency
The intertemporal choice model with uncertain lifetime combine both risk
and time. We can specify the model for being consistent with some crite-
ria of rationality. Because it uses rank- dependent utility, our model fulfils
necessarily, and by construction, the main axiom of rationality toward risk,
first order stochastic dominance (Quiggin, 1993). According to decision in
time, the main criteria of rationality is time consistency proposed by Strotz
(1956). What restriction do we have to impose to the probability transforma-
tion function to fulfil time consistency? To answer this question we have to
define properly the notion of time consistency. Using dynamic optimization,
we will use the same definition as Strotz (1956); Caputo (2005); Drouhin
(2009, 2012). In the absence of new information, an agent is said to be time
consistent if she behave in the future as she has planned in the past.
Definition 1 (Time consistency). If we denote (ct)and (at) the solution
of the program Pt. If we denote (ct′)and (at′), the optimal solution of the
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program Pt′, with t ∈ [t, T ] and:
Pt′


max
c
RDU(c) =
∫
T
t′
(1− h (Πt(s))) u (c(s)) ds
u.c. a˙(s) = w(s) + r a(s)− c(s))
a(t′) = at(t
′)
a(T ) = 0
Then an agent is time consistent if and only if:
∀t ∈ [0, T ] , ∀t′ ∈ [t, T ] , ∀s ∈ [t′, T ] : ct (s) = ct′ (s) (18)
A well known corollary of this definition is that for being time consistent
the rate of discount at each date s has to be independent from the deci-
sion date t.4 In the special case of expected utility, θt (s) = pis(s), whatever
the form of the probability distribution, it does not depend on the plan-
ning decision date, it is thus “time distance independent”, time consistency
holds. But for other cases the distribution probability of death and the rank-
dependent utility give a special mathematical structure to the discount rate
and factor. We can notice that in the most general case θt (s) is time-distance
dependent because it depends on Πt (s). It is a strong presumption for time
inconsistency. Is there nevertheless some other cases where time consistency
holds?
Proposition 2. Agent is time consistent if and only if her probability dis-
tribution transformation function is of the form h (x) = 1 − (1− x)α with
(α > 0).
Proof:
(sufficiency)
h (x) = 1− (1− x)α⇒ θt (s) = αpis (s)
The rate of discount is independent of the planning date so the choice of
consumption is time consistent.
(necessity)
If the agent is time consistent, she fulfills equation (18). As ct(s) is strictly
positive and differentiable, it implies that:
∀t ∈ [0, T ] , ∀t′ ∈ [t, T ] , ∀s ∈ [t′, T ] :
c˙t(s)
ct(s)
=
c˙t′t(s)
ct′(s)
Taking into account(13), (8), and (3) it implies that:
4See, for example, Drouhin (2012) for a rigorous proof.
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∀t ∈ [0, T ] , ∀t′ ∈ [t, T ] , ∀s ∈ [t′, T ] :
h′ (Πt (s))
1− h (Πt (s))
=
h′ (Πt′ (s))
(1− h (Πt′ (s))) (1− Πt (t′))
(19)
This equation should hold in the particular case where s = t′. Considering
this case and remarking that Πt (t) = 0, equation (19) also implies :
∀t ∈ [0, T ] , ∀t′ ∈ [t, T ] :
h′ (Πt (t
′))
1− h (Πt (t′))
=
h′ (0)
(1− Πt (t′))
(20)
This is a first order differential equation with a set of solutions fully described
by h (x) = 1− (1− x)α, with α = h′ (0). 
The distribution of the probability of dying and its treatment within
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory of choice added with an axiom of time con-
sistency gives behavioral foundations to a model of intertemporal choice that
is rather simple and not less intuitive than the standard discounted utility
model. Some points should be noticed.
1. The expected utility model is not the only one compatible with time
consistency. The rank-dependent utility model with a power function
for transforming the probability distribution5 implies also time consis-
tency. This gives behavioral foundations for a model of intertemporal
choice that is different from the original discounted expected utility
model.
2. When agent is time consistent we have:
θt(s) = αpis(s) (21)
The utility functional can be rewritten :
RDUt (c) =
∫
T
t
eα
∫
t
s
piτ (τ)dτu (c (s)) ds (22)
3. The parameter α can be interpreted as multiplicative factor of time
preference. If α > 1, this means that the agent gives a psychological
weight to present consumption more important than the instantaneous
probability of dying. In this case the agent will demonstrate preference
for present consumption. In a RDU/ Cumulative prospect theory, the
behavior is interpreted as “pessimistic” in the sense that she tends to
5Diecidue et al. (2009) provide axiomatic foundations for such probability transforma-
tion function.
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overweight her probability of dying6. In the opposite, if α < 1, the
agent will demonstrate a kind of preference for future consumption, she
underweight her probability of dying (“optimistic” behaviour).
4. InYaari (1965) the rate of discount was:
θt(s) = θ + pis(s) (23)
It means that our model has the same level of complexity as Yaari’s
model. It depends only on one parameter and on the conditional prob-
ability density of the event “dying at date s knowing you are alive at
date s. In Yaari (1965), the parameter θ interact additively with the
probability of dying. In our’s the parameter α interact multiplicatively.
Both parameters can be interpreted as measuring time preference. But
a huge difference is that in Yaari (1965) discounted expected utility
model, as in standard economic theory, the parameter θ is postulated
as a coefficient of pure time preference, in a rather ad hoc manner.
In the contrary, in our time consistent rank dependent utility model,
we have not postulated any ad-hoc form of time preference. The co-
efficient α just stems from the axiom of time consistency, as we have
demonstrated7.
To comment further, we have to consider special distributions of the age of
death. The most simple case (and not so unrealistic) is the one of a constant
hazard rate (standard Poisson process). For that to be possible we have
to allow the maximum duration of life, T, to go to infinity. Let us assume
that, for all s ∈ R+, pis(s) = pi = cst. In this case the intertemporal utility
functional is equivalent to the exponential discounting model (with α pi = θ):
RDUt (c) =
∫ +∞
t
e−αpi (s−t)u (c (s)) ds (24)
The standard model of exponential discounting is just a simplified version
of our general rank-dependent utility model of intertemporal choice with
uncertain lifetime in the special case of time consistency and constant hazard
rate.
If we adopt a more realistic model of uncertain lifetime, like for example
the Gompertz law, then the hazard rate is increasing with age. This has an
important consequence :
6See, for example, Wakker (2010), 172-176, for an extensive discussion of probability
transformation as pesimism/optimism
7Same degree of complexity, less ad-hocity, according to Occam’s razor principle, our
model is a better candidate for modeling uncertain lifetime and time insurance!
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Proposition 3. If the consumption stream is bounded and if there exists an
age tˆ such that for all t > tˆ, ∂pit(t)
∂t
> 0, then for all T ∈ R+ + {+∞} then
the intertemporal rank dependent utility functional (22) is always definite.
Proof: Obvious. 
This proposition means that our concept of multiplicative time preference
is more robust than the usual rate of pure time preference of the exponential
discounting model. In particular preference for present consumption in our
model (α > 1) is not a prerequisite for our utility functional to be definite
event when the horizon is infinite. From a behavioral perspective it means
that our model is a tool to explore possibilities than cannot be addressed
with the standard discounted expected utility model.
4 The optimal consumption path with life an-
nuities
As in Yaari (1965), we will now assume that agents have access to actuar-
ial notes issued by insurance companies or pension funds. Those notes are
contingent asset that pay R(t) as long as the agent is alive, and 0 after her
death. If insurance companies refund themselves on the bond market at the
rate r, and if those notes are actuarially fair, then it is well known that:
R(t) = r + pit(t) (25)
When there is no bequest motives, standard bonds are strictly dominated by
life annuities. Thus differential constraint of the program can be rewritten:
∀s ∈ [0, T ] , a˙(s) = w(s) + R(s)a(s)− c(s) (26)
We can now deduce the property of the optimal intertemporal consumption
profile when the agent have access to life annuities.
Proposition 4. When the agent has access to life annuities, then at each
date s, the rate of growth of the optimal consumption path planned at date t
is:
c˙t(s)
ct(s)
=
R(s)− θt(s)
γt(s)
=
r + pis(s)−
h′(Πt(s)))pit(s)
1−h(Πt(s))
γt(s)
(27)
12
Proof: We proceed exactly the same way as in Proposition 1. 
The main result of Yaari’s model was that when the agent has access to
life annuities the rate of growth of the intertemporal consumption profile was
no more determined by the conditional probability of dying, and thus was
the same as the one of the model with a certain life duration. This is why
life annuities are considered as offering perfect insurance with the meaning
that uncertainty has no more influence on the rate of growth of optimal
consumption. Obviously, as Proposition 4 shows, that is generally no more
the case in our rank-dependent utility model of intertemporal choice.
Corollary 4-a. If the agent is time consistent and has access to life annu-
ities, the rate of growth of the optimal consumption path planned at date t
is:
c˙t(s)
ct(s)
=
r + (1− α)pis(s)
γt(s)
(28)
This result is important. In the case α = 1 (expected utility), we retrieve
Yaari’s result. But if α 6= 1 , then we have not perfect insurance, i.e. the
conditional probability of dying still determine the rate of growth of the con-
sumption profile. What is is important to notice is that, in this last case, the
agent is fully rational, she fulfils simultaneously first order stochastic domi-
nance and time constancy. Nevertheless, there is no more perfect insurance
in this case8.
This result is important for analyzing social security. Within Yaari’s
model fully funded social security is considered as equivalent with life an-
nuities, and thus provides perfect insurance. In our model this is no more
necessary true, even for fully rational agents.
5 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom generally considers exponential discounting and ex-
pected utility as being the only models of choice compatible with full ra-
tionality. If those models do not fit the actual behavior of agents, then it
is legitimate to consider alternative descriptive/behavioral models. If you
believe in the conventional wisdom, you will deduce that agents are no more
rational. Obviously, from a normative point of view, that has very important
implications for policy design. However, this paper proves, in the case of life
8Using Selden (1978)’s ordinal certainty equivalent instead of rank dependent utility,
Moresi (1999) arrives to a very similar conclusion, in the special case of an iso-elastic
per period utility function. RDU is more general because it implies no restriction on the
per-period utility function.
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cycle model of choice with uncertain lifetime, that the conventional wisdom
may be false. It means that, as suggested by Zeckhauser and Viscusi (2008),
we have to better distinguish what is behavioral and what is normative.
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